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A NEW ERA FOR PRIVACY
HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR.*
The right to privacy is nowhere specifically mentioned in the
American Constitution. The term itself seems to have gamed legal
currency in a now-famous law review article written by Samual D.
Warren and Louis D Brandeis in 1890, in which they argued that
the law needed to provide protection against the invasion of an in-
dividual's privacy 1 The authors noted that in a democracy-a
society which recognizes the concept of limited government-it has
always been accepted that the "individual shall have full protection
m person and property -2 From time to time, however, it is neces-
sary, they pointed out, to "define anew the exact nature and extent
of such protection, ' ' 3 for changes in political, social, and economic
aspects of a society necessitate the recognition of new rights if
established freedoms are to be maintained. They found that certain
conditions existed m their society which threatened to destroy man's
traditional feedoms if the law was not extended to give protection
to the privacy of the individual. The effect of the article on the
development of the right to privacy is now legal legend. It was
virtually the beginning of judicial recognition of the right to privacy
m American law
Today, some seventy years later, we are faced with a problem
similar to that which stirred Warren and Brandeis to write their
article. There is once again serious reason to suggest that the
law must expand its protection if man's traditional freedoms are to
be preserved. For at a time when the growth of mass society and
spiraling technological advancements create an increased need for
some sanctuary of privacy to be left to the individual, new and
more sophisticated phenomena threaten to rob man of the defenses
* B.A.-Sam Houston State-1961, M.A.-University of Houston-1962 presently
completing his dissertation for a PhD-University of Iowa, Instructor-University of
Iowa. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Tanenhaus of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Iowa whose advice and criticism helped me at various stages
in the preparation of this article.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L, lav. 193 (1890).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Ibid.
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with which he seeks to protect himself against the invasion of
his privacy
Since the Warren and Brandeis article the courts have dealt
with the right to privacy (the state of being in retirement from
the company or observation of others4 ) in literally thousands of
cases. Yet, after seventy years of litigation, the right to privacy is
still an undeveloped concept of law By showing how the right to
privacy as a concept of law has develped in the United States, we
will demonstrate that it has grown in a patchwork fashion which,
while giving the individual substantial protection in some areas
(mostly from non-governmental sources), it has at the same time
left him awkwardly exposed to the intrusive thrusts of governmental
invasion in others, and that these points of vulnerability in the law
are now subject to being exploited by new and never-even-dreamed-
of revelations of the modern age. My argument, however, is not
without a ray of hope. By centering some attention on a case,
Griswold v Connecticut,5 recently decided by the Supreme Court,
I hope to prove that at long last the right to privacy is on the brink
of legal maturity, that in this case the Supreme Court has finally
taken the psychic plunge that will extend the right to privacy to a
full-fledged fundamental right guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY IN AMERICAN LAW
We have noted that the framers of our Constitution did not
specifically include the right to privacy in that document. This does
not necessarily mean, however, that they did not seek to protect
that right. Indeed, at least one author has argued that "the right
to be let alone is the underlying theme of the Bill of Rights." 6
It can be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that several provisions
of the Bill of Rights do contain specific protection for the privacy
of the individual. For example, the First Amendment guarantees
individual privacy in matters of religion and protects the privacy
of the individual in his beliefs and opinions. The Third Amendment
seeks to protect the privacy of the home by forbidding that any
soldier "shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the owner, now in time of war, but m a manner to
be prescribed by law " The Fourth Amendment contains the most
specific provision designed to protect the privacy of the individual.
It guarantees that the people shall be "secure in their persons,
4. State v. Powell County Third Judicial District Court, 85 Mont 215, 278 Pac. 122
(1929).
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rmv. 216 (1960).
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houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." And lastly, the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy
of the individual in his conscience and dignity
It should be obvious that the specific protections contained in
the Bill of Rights were designed to protect the privacy of the in-
dividual from those forms of invasion that were most prevalent be-
fore the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Viewed at this angle, one
might agree that the founders had a broader purpose in mind than
those specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In addition, one
might stretch a point and suggest that the Ninth Amendment reflects
this inasmuch as it provides that "the enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." In another sense it might be argued
that in a society based on the concept of limited government, "all
enumerated rights in the Constitution can be described as contribut-
ing to the right of privacy, if by the term is meant the integrity
and freedom of the individual person and personality "7
At any rate, it is significant that the right to privacy was not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution. For it caused the right
to develop in a slow, piecemeal, cumbersome, and too-often inadequ-
ate fashion. Indeed, the Bill of Rights were approaching their one-
hundredth year when Warren and Brandeis wrote their article which
finally spurred the judicial conscience to recognition of the right to
be let alone in American law The authors cited one American law
treatise" and several English cases9 in arguing that the law needed
to provide protection against the invasion of an individual's privacy
Their argument, essentially, was that the law should provide pro-
tection for an individual's personality and peace of mind as well
as for his person. They found that the principle underlying the
right to privacy was "that of an inviolate personality"10 The au-
thors traced the evolution of the law from its early design to provide
protection against physical interference with life and property to its
gradual recognition of the spiritual nature of man-his feeling and
intellect-to include man's personal right to privacy and property,
property including both man's tangible and intangible posses-
sions. The latter recognition led to the law of assault, the law of
nuisance, and the law of slander and libel. Warren and Brandeis
tell us that the evolution of the law along these lines was inevitable:
7. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, THE SUPREME
COURT REviEW, at 214 (1962).
8. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d Ed. 1888).
9. Parton v. Prang, 3 Clifford 537 (1872), Millar v. Taylor, 3 Burr. 2303, 98 L. R.
201 (1769), Jeffery v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
10. Warren 6 Brandies, Supra note 1, at 205.
11. 1d. at 195.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heighten-
ing of sensations which came with the advance of civilization,
made it clear to men that only part of the pain, pleasure,
and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions,
and sensations demanded legal recognition.""
Development in the States
Prompted by this article the state courts began to recognize
the invasion of privacy as a tort. In the first case involving the
new tort in 1902 the New York Court of Appeals in a divided opinion
(4-3) refused to recognize the invasion of privacy of a young lady
whose picture had been used without her permission. 12 The Court's
refusal led to a heated debate which resulted in a New York statute
creating a right of action in such cases. 3 In 1905 the Georgia
Supreme Court, citing the Warren-Brandeis article, allowed an in-
dividual to bring action against an agency which used his picture
without his authority,14 thus, establishing the first official judicial
recognition of the right to privacy By 1944 thirteen states "had
recognized a right of action protecting the right of privacy "15 To-
day, although the right to privacy has not been written into any
state constitution and a great deal of ambiguity still surrounds the
specific interests which the right is designed to protect, "such a
right is now recognized in most states, by judicial decision or
legislation .''16
Development on the Federal Level
On the federal level the court's response has not been quite so
extended. It is true that for a good many years the United States
Supreme Court had been willing to admit that there is such a thing
as a right to privacy In 1949, for example, the Court held that
the right to privacy-"the core of the Fourth Amendment"-was
such a basic right as to be implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty and therefore enforceable against the states.1 7 Again in 1961
the Court went so far as to refer to the right to privacy as a right
"no less important than any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people.""' But up until now in every case in which
the Supreme Court has recognized specifically that the right to
12. Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
13. N. Y. SEssioN LAws 1903, ch. 132, § 321-2.
14. Pavisch v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, (1905).
15. R. H. Adams, The Right to be Let Alone, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 598 (1965).
16. Brief for Appellants, pp. 84-85, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). I
would like to thank Professor Thomas J. Emerson of the Yale Law School for providing
me with a copy of the brief that he filed in behalf of the appellants in this case.
17. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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privacy exists and that it has been violated, the invasion of that
right was by physical means. The Court has not been willing to
find that the right has been violated by non-physical means. In a
case in 1952 the Court did recognize that the liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause embraced invasion of privacy by non-violent
means. But in that case the Court refused to uphold the claim. 9
It may very well be argued that the Court has long had the
habit of protecting the privacy of the individual in cases nvolv-
ing First and Fifth Amendment rights. This may well be true,
but in none of these cases has the Court been willing to recognize
(or admit, whatever the case might be) that the right to privacy
is what it is protecting. These cases have been firmly based on
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights such as freedom of religion, 20
speech, association 21 or protection against self-incrimination. 22 The
Court's reluctance to protect privacy from non-physical invasions is
best illustrated by those cases in which the Court has dealt with
wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
In the first case involving wiretapping the Supreme Court held
(5-4) that messages passing over a telephone were not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search
and seizure.23 Chief Justice Taft, in delivering the majority opinion,
held that the Fourth Amendment applied only to physical invasions.
Justice Holmes wrote a short dissent branding wiretapping a "dirty
business" and declaring that he would rather see some criminals
escape than see the government play "an ignoble part. '24 Justice
Brandeis wrote a vigorous dissent reiterating the thesis of his 1890
Harvard Law Review Article. In part he said:
The makers of our constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feeling and his
intelligence. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred as against the government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.25
19. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollock, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
20. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), School District of Abbington Township
v. Schenpp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
21. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963).
22. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 198 (1957) Sweeney v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957), Barenblatt v. United States, 306 U.S. 109 (1959).
23. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. Id. at 470. Taft was deeply hurt by Holmes' dissent which he called the "the hast-
lest opinion." See MURPHy, WRETAPPING ON TRIAL, 124-125 (1965),
25. Id. at 478.
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Brandeis further stated his belief that protections against govern-
mental abuses must be adapted to changing conditions, and warned
that modern science was increasingly capable of taking away man's
privacy
In his majority opinion Chief Justice Taft had pointed out that
Congress could pass a law excluding wiretap evidence from federal
criminal trials. In 1934 Congress passed the Federal Communica-
tions Act, section 605 of which reads:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any communication and divulge or publish the existence, con-
tents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such inter-
cepted communications to any person.
A case coming before the Court in 1937 maintained that this statute
made wiretapping a federal crime and therefore any evidence ob-
tained by this method could not be used against him.26 The Supreme
Court agreed, stating that section 605 prohibited wiretapping without
the consent of the sender 27 The individual was retried on technical
grounds and convicted again. Once more the case reached the
Supreme Court and this time the Court held not only that direct
wiretap evidence was inadmissible "but also that evidence which
had been obtained through leads secured by wiretapping was simi-
larly barred. ' 12 The two Nardone cases did not have the effect
of overruling Olmstead but as one author stated they put Olmstead
"in a state of legal limbo. ' 29
Since the Nardone cases dealt with federal officials and federal
activities, it was not clear what effect the cases would have on the
activities of state officials. The question was not answered until
1952 when the Court granted certiorari in the case of Schwartz v
Texas to determine whether section 605 forbade the use of evidence
obtained by wiretap in a state court.30 The Court held that the
states could follow the old common law rule of admitting evidence
regardless of the method employed to secure it. The question that
still remained to be answered was this: Would it be a federal crime
for states to employ the wiretap? In 1957 the Court cleared up any
doubt about this by ruling that state officials violated section 605 in
tapping telephones, and such evidence could not be turned over to
federal officials to be used in federal courts. 1 Even though Mapp
26. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
27. There Is some doubt that Congress meant to prohibit wiretapping when it passed
this act. See MURpHY, WrRnE'rsren ON TRiLt, at 133 (1965).
28. Id. at 134.
29. Id. at 140.
30. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
31. Benantl v. United States, 365 U.S. 96 (1957).
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v Ohio obviously overruled the Schwartz case, to this date the
Department of Justice has never prosecuted police for violating sec-
tion 605, and there seems to be little evidence that they shall.
There seem to be other limitations on the sweep of section 605
besides those revealed so far As interpreted by the Courts, section
605 does not prohibit tapping when done with the consent of either
of the parties to the phone conversation. 32 In addition, one not a
party to the tapped conversation has no standing to object to the
divulgence of its contents.3 3 And, of course, section 605 does not
provide protection from electronic eavesdropping, since the Federal
Communications Act applies only when telephone, telegraph, or
radiotelegraph conversations are overheard. It is sad but true that
the Court's decisions have not provided much in the way of pro-
tection from electronic eavesdropping either The only instances in
which the constitutional protections against unreasonable search and
seizure have been applied to electronic snooping have been those
instances in which the snooping is accomplished by some form of
physical invasion of trespass.
The Court was faced with its first case involving electronic
eavesdropping in 1940 in the case of Goldman v United States.3 4
Here federal agents had obtained evidence against three lawyers
for conspiring to violate the Federal Bankruptcy Act by the use of
a detectaphone, a device capable of amplifying the sound of voices
talking on the other side of a wall. By occupying an office ad-
jacent to the office of the lawyers they were able to overhear a
number of incriminating conversations. The court held (5-4) that this
act did not violate section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.3 5
In 1961 the court delivered the only opinion m which it has ever
found that electronic surveillance was used in an unconstitutional
manner As might be expected, the case involved an overt form
of physical invasion. District of Columbia police had driven a device
known as a spike mike (a small nail-like device) into a suspect's
wall until it touched a heating unit, "which had the effect of per-
mitting the police to overhear all that was said throughout the house
for a nine-day period." 6 This the Court stated in a unanimous
opinion violated the Fourth Amendment. 7 Justice Douglas was dis-
turbed that the Court's decision was based on the fact that a physi-
cal invasion had occurred. He felt that
32. Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
33. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
34. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
35. On Lee v. United Sttaes, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
36. Beaney, Supra note 7, at 233.
37. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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the command of the Fourth Amendment [should not] be
limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of electronic
equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be
whether the privacy of the home was invaded. 8
In the most recent case involving electronic eavesdropping the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when an
Internal Revenue agent recorded a bribe offer by means of a
pocket wire recorder hidden on his person.3 9 Justice Brennan wrote
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Goldberg and Douglas con-
curred, stating that he thought it
an intolerable anomaly that while conventional searchers
and seizures are regulated by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments and wiretapping is prohibited by federal stat-
ute, electronic surveillance as involed in the instant case,
which poses the greatest danger to the right of private free-
dom, is wholly beyond the pale of federal law 40
He further stated that he could not help
but believe that if we continue to condone electronic surveil-
lance we shall be contributing to a climate of official
lawlessness and conceding the helplessness of the Constitu-
tion and this Court to protect rights "fundamental to a free
society "41
In summary, the most obvious thing that we might say is that
the Court's response (not to mention that of the national legis-
lature) to the challenges presented to individual privacy by wire-
tapping and electronic surveillance has been less than adequate.
This survey also highlights two of our previous points. First, that
because the right to privacy has had to develop in a piecemeal
fashion it has not provided adequate protection for the individual
in all areas. In fact, the development of the law has been such that
the individual is better protected from non-governmental sources
than governmental sources. Secondly, the cases point out the Court's
reluctance to recognize that privacy can be invaded in more subtle
fashion than mere physical invasion.
The magnitude of the problem is increased considerably by the
fact that modern science is now capable of invading the privacy of
the individual in much more substantial form than any that we
38. Id. at 513.
39. Lepez V. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
40. Id. at 471.
41. Ibid.
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have surveyed so far It is toward a consideration of this problem
that we now turn.
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
The sophistication that science and technology have achieved
in the twentieth century has raised the spectre of invasion of priv-
acy to new and frightening heights. To some extent the public
has been made aware of these advances through protest literature
such as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's
Nineteen Eighty-Four, both of which portray societies stripped of
of privacy Popular exposes, such as Vance Packard's The Naked
Society and Myron Brenton's The Privacy Invaders have played a
similar role. 42
The hoary art of wiretapping is one of the most commonly
understood forms of privacy invasion and one, as we have seen,
that has been dealt with by both Congress and the courts. Sub-
stantial evidence indicates that it is in wide use. In 1962 a House
Committee reported that at least 5,000 telephones in federal offices
in Washington were bugged, not by Russians, but by bureaucrats
spying on each other 43 The same report revealed that over 10,000
snooping devices were being used by private businesses." And
another author reported that in the years 1953 and 1954 police in
New York City were tapping over 3,500 telephones, almost half of
which were public telephone booths. 45 Wiretapping's progeny-elec-
tronic surveillance-is poorly understood, virtually unregulated by
the law, little restrained by the courts, and, as we have seen, cap-
able of taking various and ingenious forms. The Eavesdroppers,'
4
a book written in that ancient year 1959 revealed the following forms
of electronic snooping:
Any telephone can quickly be transformed into a microphone
which transmits every sound in the room when the receiver
is on the hook. Tiny microphones can be secreted behind a
picture or in some other inconspicuous location. Highly
directive microphones known as "parabolic microphones"
are capable of eavesdropping on a conversation taking place
in an office on the opposite side of a hundred-foot-wide
busy street or on a conversation in a restaurant from, say,
a darkened balcony in the building. A small, continuously
42. Westin, Surveillance, Privacy, and the Free Society, 14 Sept. 1965, (A paper pre-
pared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.)
43. Heartngs Before the Senate Subcommittee on Admsnistrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on the Invasions of Privacy, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 16 (1965).
44. Ibid.
45. MURPHY, Supra note 27, at 150.
46. DAsH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
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operating transmitter can be placed beneath the fender of
an automobile and its signal picked up by a receiver in
another car or in a fixed plant. 47
Even though each of these devices is devilishly ingenious, in com-
parison to some of the newer forms of electronic surveillance, as
we shall see, they are child's play
In the last couple of years Congress has begun to show signs
of concern over increasing threats to privacy In 1964 the Senate
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure began a
preliminary investigation of the use of surveillance devices by federal
agencies. Subcommittee chairman Edward V Long (D., Mo.) re-
vealed that he met with less than complete candor in his prelimin-
ary investigation and that two federal agencies refused to turn in-
formation over to him.48 Nevertheless, he found that on the basis
of a questionnaire sent out by his committee numerous federal
agencies not involved in security work had purchased a considerable
quantity of surveillance equipment.4 9 When the new session of
Congress convened (89th) investigations into federal invasion of
privacy were resumed. Hearings were opened on electronic eaves-
droppings, wiretapping, peepholes, mail covers, censorship, and
psychiatric testing. Chairman Long stated that the Subcommittee
sought to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the techniques
of surveillance made possible by modern electronics in order to
determine whether their use was "beginning seriously to infringe
on the privacy of individuals everywhere in this land." 50 He ex-
pressed concern over the "literally thousands" of non-security law
enforcement agencies which were using "more and more methods
of surveillance upon the individual.' ' 1 He noted that:
[I]n the hands of a competent operator, these insidious
devices spell an end to the personal and business privacy
of anyone brought into their range. They are neither science
fiction pipedreams nor are they solely for the use of the
technically skilled or rich. Many are uncomplicated in op-
eration, virtually incapable of detection and widely available
at relatively low cost. 52
Long also pointed out that existing laws in the field of privacy
were few and conflicting. As an example, he pointed out that even
though wiretapping had been outlawed by Congress. the law was
47. DODD'S CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 691 (Supp. 1963).






A NEW ERA FOR PRIVACY
not enforced and several states had enacted laws in direct conflict
with the federal law 53 Needless to say, the states have suffered
no repercussion from federal authorities for their errant behavior
During the course of the two-week investigation numerous elec-
tronic snooping devices were demonstrated to the Committee (seem-
ingly with glee) by private detectives, electronic manufacturing and
sales representatives, and several electronic engineers. Some of the
snooping devices took the form of tie clasps, packages of cigarettes,
cigarette lighters, picture frames, women's purses, men's brief-
cases, etc. One of the witnesses before the committee demonstrated
a device that could be hooked to a telephone and when activated
by a direct-dialing call conversations could be monitored from, say, a
room in Washington from as far away as Hawaii. 54 Another witness
demonstrated a tiny microphone that was cotton-coated so that it
could be dyed with Tintex to match the interior of a. room. 55 A
private detective demonstrated probably the cruelest device of them
all. It was a transmitter and antenna in the form of a cocktail
olive and toothpick which could be placed in a martin. 56 One can
only imagine the disadvantage an individual would be placed in
when subjected to the twin effects of the ancient lubricant of the
tongue in combination with the latest in electronic ingenuity Lastly,
a retired Bell Telephone Laboratories engineer reported that a laser
was being developed which could be aimed at a room several blocks
away to obtain a television picture of everything happening in the
room-complete with sound.
57
Modern technology has produced techniques that go far beyond
these examples of physical surveillance including various forms of
psychological surveillance. The polygraph is the most familiar form
of psychological surveillance designed to probe the interiors of the
mind, and it is today widely used not only by those involved in
police work, but also by numerous private corporation and govern-
ment agencies. On the horizon of technological perfection are sev-
eral forms of psychological probing which could have extraordinary
implications for privacy Listen to what one author tells us:
Advances in drug research indicate that we may be approach-
ing the point at which the administration of a drug (with
or without the subject's knowledge) may render him a truth-
53. Ibid. It should be noted that in suggesting that the law is not enforced chairman
Long is referring to the Department of Justice. We have seen that the federal courts en-
force the law when it comes before them, but the courts can only wait for the cases since
they have no self-starter.
54. Id. at 24-25.
55. Id. at 32.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 21-22.
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ful person under questioning; already, arguments in favor
of such narcoanalysis under new drugs have appeared in
police and legal journals. Finally, research in brain-wave
analysis established that "reading" certain signals of the
brain is now possible; if this progresses in the coming decades
to the ability to distinguish the more complex messages
involved in thought and emotions, direct interrogation of the
mind may become the "ultimate weapon" in penetration of
privacy 58
These are just some of the challenges that mass society and
modern science have imposed upon individual privacy Some of
them, indeed, are awesome. It hardly takes a legal scholar to
recognize that our law has not and is not maintaining the same
pace as our technology In the future if the Supreme Court fails
to protect the individual against those forms of non-physical mva-
sions of privacy that we have surveyed here, the right itself will
be nothing more than an empty promise. It is obvious that Bran-
deis' prophetic fears expressed in his dissent in the Olmstead case
have come true. Thus he warned us that:
[T]he progress of science m furnishing the government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-
tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may
bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and
emotions. Can it be that the Constitution affords no
protection against such invasions of individual security959
Amazing as it may seem, nearly four decades later we would have
to say that the question still remains unanswered or that it has been
answered in the negative. But now we are ready to take a look
at the recent case of Griswold v Connectcut which I have promised
has nestled within it new and important implications for the right
to privacy.
THE GRISWOLD CASE AND ITS HISTORY
Four times citizens of the state of Connecticut have reached
the United States Supreme Court in an effort to have sections 53-32
and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1938) declared
unconstitutional. The first three efforts were abortive. Now, in June
of 1965, success was theirs. The Court held that a Connecticut law
58. Westin, Supra note 42, at 3.
59. Olmstead v. United States, 217 U.S. 474 (1928).
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forbidding the dissemination and use of contraceptives was a vio-
lation of the constitutionally protected right to privacy of married
couples. In the first three cases, Tilston v Ullman,60 Trubek v
Ullman,6 ' and Poe v Ullman,6 2 the plaintiffs sought declaratory
judgments that the Connecticut statutes violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by depriving them of life and property without due
process. In the first case the plaintiff (a physician) tried to bring
a class action, but the Court was in agreement that he did not
have standing to raise the constitutional rights of his patients. In
the second case a young married couple brought a declaratory judg-
ment on the grounds that the statutes denied them of their rights
without due process of law, because it denied them the ability to
obtain medical advice on proper methods of contraception so that
they could avoid parenthood until they were psychologically and
economically prepared for such responsibilities. The Supreme Court
denied the petition for certiorari. In the third case the Court show-
ed some discontent among its members. The case involved several
citizens of Connecticut who thought the law denied them due process,
but the court held (5-4) that the case did not present a controversy
justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue. Justice Frank-
furter wrote the majority opinion upholding dismissal and he was
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark and Whittaker
Justice Brennan concurred in the result. Justice Douglas wrote a
dissenting opinion stating that "liberty within the purview of the
Fifth Amendment includes the right of privacy" and the "liberty
is a concept that sometimes gains content from the emanation of
other specific guarantees or from experience with the require-
ments of a free society ",63 Justice Harlan, usually acknowledged
as the most consistent practioner of self-restraint on the Court,
wrote a vigorous dissent based on the "Palko rule" in which he
stated his belief that the "Constitution protect (ed) the privacy of
the home against all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character. '64
Justices Black and Stewart dissented without opinion.
With this background it seemed obvious that the Court would
not consider the constitutionality of the statutes unless it could be
proven that they were enforceable. In other words, someone would
have to be prosecuted under the law Such an occurrence took place
in 1961 when the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and a physician-professor who served as
60. 318 U.S. 44 (1942).
61. 367 U.S. 907 (1961).
62. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
63. Id. at 517.
64. Id. at 550.
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Medical Director for the league were arrested and fined $100 each.
The contested statutes read thus:6
5
Section 53-32 provides:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instru-
ment for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than
sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined or
imprisoned.
Section 54-196 provides:
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted
and punished as if he were the principal offender
The plaintiffs were found guilty as accessories. They contested
their conviction in the state courts on the grounds that the accessory
statute as applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. After fail-
ing to gain relief in the state courts they applied to the Supreme
Court. This time the Court found that the plaintiffs had a judiciable
cause. Justice Douglas stated:
The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely
to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them. 68
The decision of the Court was divided 7 to 2. Even a perfunc-
tory reading of the case reveals numerous indications that the
Court had a difficult time deciding the case. Besides the majority
opinion there were three concurring opinions and two separate dis-
senting opinions. Consider chart I-A below
Griswold v. Connecticut
Douglas + Majority opinion, joined by Justice Clark (They found a general
Clark + right to privacy arising out of the totality of the Bill of Rights).
Goldberg + Concurring in the opinion and judgment, joined by Chief Justice
Warren + Warren, and Justice Brennan (They found that the concept of
Brennan + liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and
the right to privacy is a fundamental personal right).
Harlan + Concurring in the judgment (He found a right to privacy in the
guarantees of liberty under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
White + Concurring the judgment (He found a right to privacy in the
guarantees of liberty under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
Black - Dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Stewart.
Stewart - Dissenting opimon, joined by Justice Black.
65. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479.
66. Id. at 1680.
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In the majority opinion Justice Douglas returned to his thesis In
the Poe case that there is a general right to privacy arising out
of the totality of the Bill of Rights. In part he reasoned that:
The Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from these guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy The right
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time
of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the right of the people to be secure in-their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searchers and sei-
zures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which govern-
ment may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: The ennumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.61
The concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg has receive more at-
tention than any other part of the decision; primarily, because of
the mistaken belief that he found a right to privacy in the Ninth
Amendment. Actually, this is not true. Justice Goldberg's opinion
is based on three points: (1) that the concept of liberty contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment protects those personal rights of the
individual that are fundamental; (2) that the fundamental rights of
the individual are broader than those specifically enumerated in the
Bill of Rights; and (3) that this interpretation is backed up not
only by numerous decisions of the Court, but also by the particular
wording of the Ninth Amendment. He is not suggesting that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Ninth Amendment or that
the Ninth Amendment contains a store of individual rights. He is
simply saying that the Ninth Amendment shows a
[b]elief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental
rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights in-
cluded there is not exhaustive. 68
In what must be the single most pungent sentence in the whole
opinion Justice Goldberg states:
I agree fully with the Court that the right of privacy is
a fundamental personal right, emanating from the totality
of the Constitutional scheme under which we live.69
67. Id. at 1681.
68. Id. at 1686.
69. Id. at 1687.
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Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment of the Court but not
the opinion because he could not agree with what he believed to
be Justice Douglas' conclusion that the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found
to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of
the Bill of Rights. 0
Instead Justice Harlan preferred to apply the "Palko rule" to the
case to see if the statutes infringed the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the enactments violated basic
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty " He found that
it did; for reasons, he said, already enumerated in his dissenting
opinion in Poe v Ullman. There he had maintained that the
"Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all unreason-
able intrusion of whatever character "71 He further stated that
it would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing sub-
stance to form were it held that the constitutional principle
of privacy against arbitrary official intrusion comprehends
only physical invasion by the police.7
2
Justice White wrote a concurring opinion simply stating that in
his opinion the statute as applied deprived married couples of lib-
erty without due process of law Justice Black and Stewart dis-
sented on the grounds that even though they thought the law
"uncommonly silly" they did not believe that there was a constitu-
tional right to privacy that had been invaded by the state statute.
The opinions of the Court in this case have been the subject
of some criticism. One professor of constitutional law, for example,
paid his rather caustic respects to the case by suggesting that the
Supreme Court had played "scrabble" with the Bill of Rights, taking
a letter here, a letter there, until it had formulated the right to
privacy 73 Another suggested that the opinions "were not entirely
persuasive as either constitutional history or sound doctrinal devel-
opment of newly emerging substantial rights." 7' The latter argu-
ment is, of course, true. The former is, of course, ludicrous and
one assumes and hopes that it was meant to be. But, at any rate,
the case itself has a more profound significance. For not only have
seven judges found that the Constitution protects privacy, but, for
70. Id. at 1690.
71. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 550 (1960).
72. Id. at 551.
73. Address by Professor John Roche, American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, Sept. 8-11, 1965.
74. Westin, Supra note 42, at 24.
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the first time, the Court has specifically ruled that the right to
privacy has been violated by non-physical means.
TOMORROW AND TOMORROW
Where does the right to privacy go from here? Possibly a
long way For even though the struggle over the development of the
right to privacy has been long by the standards of a man's years,
it still has a long way to go. But in finally recognizing that the
right to privacy can be violated by non-physical as well as by
physical means, the Supreme Court has finally accepted the funda-
mental thesis of the Warren-Brandeis article. That is that "the in-
vasion of privacy involves a spiritual wrong, an injury to a man's
estimate of himself and an assault upon his own feelings. ' 75 In
other words, that what is protected by privacy is the right to an
"inviolate personality ",76 For all these years the Court has mouth-
ed platitudes about a man's home being his castle. Yet, all the
Court has been willing to protect is the castle door, not the sanctity
within.
There have been many instances m which individual members
of the Supreme Court have recognized the irony of this. Some of
the most obvious being Brandeis' dissent in the Olmstead case;
Harlan's dissent in Poe v Ullman; and both Douglas' dissent in
the Poe case, and his opinion in the Silverman77 case. Indeed, four
years before Warren and Brandeis wrote their celebrated article,
Justice Bradley, referring to a celebrated English decision,78 wrote
in Boyd v United States that:
[T]he principles laid down in this opinion affect the very
essence of Constitutional liberty and security They reach
father than the concrete form of the case then before the
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees
of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence
-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of Lord Canden's judgment.7 9
Having finally recognized this point, the Supreme Court has taken
75. Bloustem, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N. Y. U. L. REv. 33 (1964).
76. Warren & Brandeis, The light to Prsvacy, 4 HRv. L. R.Ev. 193 (1890).
77. Olmstead v. United Sttaes, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) , Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
78. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Rr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
79. 116 U.S. 630 (1885).
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that necessary and last vital step which should allow the right to
privacy to develop into a full-fledged fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution.
One cannot help but wonder if the Court could now still uphold
a case such as Goldman, or even whether Olmstead is not now
subject to being overruled. At the very least the particular nature
of our legal system should make Griswold a very important case.
Professor Edward H. Levi, Dean of Law at the University of Chicago,
tells us that the
basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.
It is reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process
described by the doctrine of precedent in which a proposition
descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and
then applied to a next similar situtation. The steps are
these: Similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of
law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of
law is made applicable to the second case.8°
In a system of law of this nature, surely Griswold will become an
important precedent by which the court can expand the right of
privacy to new areas. If so, we may well be on the brink of a
new era for privacy
If the right to privacy develops as I have suggested and the
Supreme Court does in the future declare that the right to privacy
is a fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution the result,
no doubt, would be quite dramatic. Although the right to privacy,
like any constitutional right, would not be absolute, it would be
raised to the level of other fundamental rights such as freedom of
speech, press, and association. Its violation could take place only
under those circumstances where the interest of society outweigh
those of the individual. No doubt a rash of litigation would result
from such a ruling, and surely the fine lines of the right would
develop only after extended interpretation. Hopefully, however, the
final product would represent the best reasoning of many efforts
and the right to privacy would be elevated to the privileged heights
that the preservation of individual dignity demands.
80. LmVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REBONING at 7, (1948).
